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A B S T R ACT. This article examines the co-operation between unionists and liberals in inter-war Glasgow.
As with the parliamentary challenge of labour, unionists and liberals were confronted at the local level also.
The usual response was some sort of municipal alliance or pact. In Scotland, where unionist support for
continuing links with liberals was particularly pronounced, this took the form of speciﬁc ‘moderate ’ parties
created to contest local elections. This strategy was markedly successful in keeping labour out of oﬃce. The
moderates secured their majority in Glasgow by completely dominating the middle-class wards and winning
a number of working-class seats. Moderate success is examined through the essential unity of the middle-
class vote, the more limited local franchise, and religious sectarianism. However, it became increasingly
diﬃcult for the moderates to satisfy both their middle-class and working-class supporters. The sudden
emergence of a militant protestant party in the depths of the depression provided a temporary vehicle of protest,
which split the moderate vote and allowed labour in to power in 1933.
I
In recent years considerable attention has been paid to the fortunes of the Con-
servative party in the inter-war period. No longer are historians prepared to, as
McKibbin puts it, take Conservative success ‘ for granted’ but are analysing and
explaining the Tory dominance in both England and Scotland.1 The work of
such as Williamson, Jarvis, and Hutchison, tends to depict the Conservatives in a
more positive light : not simply the unwitting beneﬁciaries but also the architects
of change; not merely reactionary but willing to embrace a degree of social re-
formism.2 Yet, there remains the recognition that, in the post-war years, perhaps
* I would like to thank Iain Hutchison and two anonymous referees for their helpful comments on
an earlier draft of this article.
1 R. I. McKibbin, ‘Class and conventional wisdom: the Conservative party and the ‘public’ in
inter-war Britain’, in idem, The ideologies of class : social relations in Britain, 1880–1950 (Oxford, 1991),
p. 259.
2 P. Williamson, Stanley Baldwin : conservative leadership and national values (Cambridge, 1999) ; D. Jarvis,
‘British conservatism and class politics in the 1920s’, English Historical Review, 111 (1996), pp. 59–84;
I. G. C. Hutchison, ‘Unionism between the two world wars’, in C. M. M. Macdonald, ed., Unionist
Scotland, 1800–1997 (Edinburgh, 1998), pp. 87–8.
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up to 1929, the political situation was ‘extraordinarily ﬂuid ’.3 What this ﬂuidity
suggests to some is that the liberals were not yet dead in the water and that had
the ‘progressive alliance’ of liberal and labour been re-established, this long
period of Conservative dominance could have been avoided. This perspective
can be found, implicitly, in the work of Biagini and Reid.4 It is also the explicit
political message in the current writings of the leaders of ‘New Labour ’. For
instance, Tony Blair has quoted approvingly Professor Marquand on the ‘pro-
gressive dilemma’, and Philip Gould clearly identiﬁes the Labour party’s adop-
tion of the 1918 constitution as forcing the break with liberalism.5
Such a position can ﬁnd (some) comfort in studies which question the supposed
inevitability of the rise of labour and its displacement of the Liberal party, and
which emphasize the continuing strength of the liberal vote after 1918.6 Yet, it
is interesting that the authors of such revisionist pieces themselves question
the very notion of a post-war progressive vote. For instance Hart has commented
in his critique of Matthew et al. that ‘ for most of the years 1918–26, the Liberals
were not progressive ’.7 Tanner identiﬁes both the weakness of the new liberals
and their own diminished concern with reform.8 And Hutchison remarks of
the Scottish liberals that ‘ they had little to oﬀer the working class and social
progressives after 1918’.9 This article takes that insight further and argues that
any interpretation which posits a labour–liberal alliance after the war misses
the point completely, since the essential political divide in the inter-war period –
both at the national, and, more explicitly, at the local level – was between the
right and left, between liberal and conservative on one hand, and labour on
the other.
At the end of the First World War the dilemma facing those committed to
maintaining the rights of property and the status quo was how to resist the en-
croaching tide of ‘ socialism’ or ‘bolshevism’ at home as well as abroad.10 Only
when the coalition collapsed in 1922 did the hopes of a united party of the
3 The phrase is that of Professor Marquand, in D. Marquand, Ramsay MacDonald (London, 1977),
p. 792.
4 E. F. Biagini and A. J. Reid, eds., Currents of radicalism: popular radicalism, organised labour and party
politics in Britain, 1850–1914 (Cambridge, 1991), p. 19.
5 T. Blair, New Britain : my vision of a young country (London, 1996), p. 10; P. Gould, The unﬁnished
revolution ; how the modernisers saved the Labour party (London, 1998).
6 The ‘ inevitability ’ view is expressed in H. Pelling, ‘Labour and the downfall of liberalism’, in
idem, Popular politics and society in late Victorian Britain (London, 1979) ; R. I. McKibbin, The evolution of the
Labour party, 1910–1924 (Oxford, 1924) ; H. C. G. Matthew, R. I. McKibbin, and J. A. Kay, ‘The
franchise factor in the rise of the Labour party’, English Historical Review, 91 (1976), pp. 723–52; C. Cook,
The age of alignment : electoral politics in Britain, 1922–1929 (London, 1975).
7 M. Hart, ‘The Liberals, the war and the franchise’, English Historical Review, 97 (1982), p. 826.
8 D. Tanner, Political change and the Labour party, 1900–1918 (Cambridge, 1990), p. 427.
9 I. G. C. Hutchison, Scottish politics in the twentieth century (Basingstoke, 2001), p. 39.
10 What Wrigley, paraphrasing Marx, terms ‘The spectre haunting Europe’. C. Wrigley, Lloyd
George and the challenge of labour : the post-war coalition, 1918–1922 (Hemel Hempstead, 1990), p. 13.
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right ﬁnally come to an end.11 However, it is clear that even after this, in many
areas conservatives and liberals (both ‘ independent ’ and ‘national ’) continued to
operate de facto electoral pacts.12 Alongside such arrangements at the parlia-
mentary level, were more intimate and lasting coalitions operating in municipal
politics.13
National and local politics can, and often do, operate by diﬀerent criteria and
respond to diﬀerent issues. For instance, Glasgow and Sheﬃeld witnessed the
more or less total collapse of the liberals as a signiﬁcant parliamentary force
after the war and, in both, the anti-labour parties formally united in municipal
politics. Yet, in Glasgow a parliamentary majority was achieved by labour as
early as 1922, whereas this was not achieved in Sheﬃeld until 1929. In contrast
however, labour secured a municipal majority in Sheﬃeld in 1926, some nine
years before doing so in Glasgow.14 None the less, the two cities did become rec-
ognized labour strongholds with the party dominating parliamentary and mu-
nicipal representation in the late 1930s. Moreover, and this is more germane to
the argument here, municipal electoral pacts between liberal and conservative
made parliamentary arrangements all the more likely.15 In Glasgow, as in the
other Scottish cities and towns, the arrangements tended towards the formation
of a speciﬁc local government party, usually termed the ‘moderates ’, though
latterly ‘progressive ’ became the favoured title. In England such amalgamations
were less usual, though they were constructed in Sheﬃeld, Bristol, and various
other towns.16
However, the crucial point is that the alliance was always one way – between
liberal and conservative – and always for one purpose – to keep labour out of
oﬃce. This point is reinforced by the multi-volume study of Davies and Morley
into the county boroughs of England and Wales. Whatever form the political
arrangement took, they conclude that ‘ It is striking that in all the boroughs con-
sidered so far, the political struggle at the municipal level resolved itself quite
rapidly after 1918 into more or less a straight ﬁght between labour and anti-labour
forces. ’17 The subject of this article is how that alliance was created in Glasgow,
why it was so successful for much of the inter-war period, and why it eventually
failed. Among the issues that will be examined in this narrative are the political
11 S. Ball, The Conservative party and British politics, 1902–1951 (London, 1995), p. 65. Cowling sees
the 1924 election as having ‘destroyed all hope of a centre Party’, M. Cowling, The impact of Labour,
1920–1924 (Cambridge, 1921), p. 2.
12 Cook, Age of alignment, pp. 287–94; Hutchison, Scottish politics, pp. 46–7.
13 Cook, Age of alignment, chs. 3 and 4; Wrigley, Lloyd George, pp. 243–4.
14 General election information is taken from F. W. S. Craig, British parliamentary election results,
1918–1949 (Glasgow, 1969). For Sheﬃeld municipal politics, see H. Mathers, ‘The city of Sheﬃeld
1893–1926’, and A. Thorpe, ‘The consolidation of a labour stronghold’, both in C. Binﬁeld et al., eds.,
The history of the city of Sheﬃeld, 1843–1993, I : Politics (Sheﬃeld, 1993), pp. 53–84, and pp. 85–118.
15 Cook, Age of alignment, pp. 290–1; Hutchison, Scottish politics, p. 57.
16 Cook, Age of alignment, p. 52; Mathers, ‘City of Sheﬃeld’ ; Thorpe, ‘Consolidation’.
17 S. Davies and B. Morley, County borough elections in England and Wales, 1918–1938: a comparative
analysis, II : Bradford – Carlisle (Aldershot, 2000) p. 653.
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unity of the middle class, the franchise factor, religious sectarianism, and the
impact of the depression.
I I
Formal electoral pacts were easier to create in Scotland since municipal politics
had been traditionally fought without party labels.18 Prior to 1914 it was labour
and socialist aspirants only who identiﬁed themselves as in any way party pol-
itical. Since they only ever represented a minority of candidates they could be
regarded or dismissed as somehow foreign to the system. Of course, this non-
political screen at elections concealed the fact that party attachments did exist
within the Council chambers with loose, though identiﬁable, groupings of lib-
erals, liberal unionists, and conservatives. Although Glasgow retained its public
reputation as a model, reforming local authority, there was an increasing reaction
against municipal control and rising rates. The creation of a Citizens’ Union in
the late 1890s saw an increasing anti-socialist element in Glasgow’s local politics,
which became more pronounced as labour began to enjoy increased represen-
tation in working-class wards in the years before the war.19 In a foretaste of the
greater polarity of post-war politics, the creation of the Glasgow Labour party in
1913 saw an anti-socialist alliance, known as the ‘moderates ’, formed to stand
against labour candidates.20 Elsewhere similar reactions of liberal–conservative
co-operation occurred where labour was beginning to make some progress in the
municipal polls.21
The new political situation in 1918 witnessed both the rise of labour to a pos-
ition of independent strength and the almost utter collapse of the Liberal party
in Glasgow. The issuing of the ‘coupon’ by Lloyd George and Bonar Law was
particularly harsh on the independent liberals and particularly fortuitous for the
unionists. Of the city’s ﬁfteen parliamentary constituencies, ten went unionist,
three were secured by coalition liberals, and one each by coalition labour and
labour. There were no independent liberals returned. It has been shown that
Scottish liberalism retained popular support and, indeed, enjoyed resurgence in
18 W. Miller, ‘Politics in the Scottish city, 1832–1882’, in G. Gordon, ed., Perspectives of the Scottish city
(Aberdeen, 1985), p. 181.
19 I. Maver, Glasgow (Manchester, 2000), pp. 153–61; see also idem, ‘Glasgow’s civic government ’,
in W. H. Fraser and I. Maver, eds., Glasgow : II : 1830–1912 (Manchester, 1996), pp. 475–7; J. J. Smyth,
Labour in Glasgow, 1896–1936: socialism, suﬀrage, sectarianism (East Linton, 2000), pp. 51, 63, 71–3.
20 I. Maver [Sweeney], ‘Local party politics and the Temperance crusade: Glasgow, 1890–1902’,
Scottish Labour History Society Journal, 27 (1992), pp. 44–63, at p. 58.
21 In Sheﬃeld, ‘A municipal alliance between the Conservative and Liberal parties was eﬀectively
in existence from 1913’ : Mathers, ‘City of Sheﬃeld’, p. 75. For similar anti-Labour alliances in Lon-
don, Leicester, and West Yorkshire see P. Thompson, Socialists, Liberals and Labour : the struggle for London,
1885–1914 (London, 1967) ; B. Lancaster, Radicalism, co-operation and socialism: Leicester working class politics,
1860–1906 (Leicester, 1987) ; K. Laybourn and J. Reynolds, Liberalism and the rise of Labour, 1890–1918
(London, 1984).
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1923 when the united party won more seats than the unionists.22 However, there
was to be no evidence of this in the city they had dominated for most of the
previous century ; the last liberal seat was lost at the 1923 election.
What is interesting about the Glasgow situation was that in spite of the liberal
decline, unionist opinion was overwhelmingly in support of continuing the al-
liance. At the Carlton Club, a clear majority of Scottish members voted in favour
of maintaining the coalition, a view shared more widely within the party with
particular fears about what would happen in Glasgow if the association was to
end.23
The results in 1922 showed why the unionists had good reason to seek com-
mon cause with the liberals. In a seismic shift of political loyalties, labour secured
ten of the Glasgow constituencies, ﬁve of which were in three-way contests.
Labour’s victory in the suburban seat of Cathcart is particularly revealing. A
coalition liberal had been successful in 1918 and a large number of unionists
within the constituency protested when a unionist was chosen to run against
the new national liberal candidate, the prominent businessman, Sir Andrew
Duncan. In the manifesto issued by this group the link between national and
municipal elections is clear, ‘ the time is most inopportune for splitting the mod-
erate vote, and it would be calamitous if as a result of the division, Cathcart
should be represented in Parliament by a Labourist or Socialist ’.24 It was clear
that such contests worked to labour’s beneﬁt overall. In the elections of 1922,
1923, and 1929 labour won ten seats, whereas in 1924, when there were no three-
cornered contests, labour representation fell back to a more representative eight
MPs. The Unionists knew that they had been ﬂattered by the result in 1918 and
self-preservation made many keen to maintain their alliance with the liberals.
Even in 1924 it was common knowledge that both parties in Scotland were op-
erating ‘ secret ’ pacts in a large number of constituencies.25
I I I
If such a strategy made sense and paid dividends at the parliamentary level, the
logic was even more pressing when it came to municipal elections. The repulse of
labour at the general election in 1918 was a matter of great satisfaction among
right-wing opinion in Glasgow; ‘If there was any reason to question the City’s
allegiance to the Government the ballot box has supplied an answer which is
almost staggering in its decisiveness. ’26
22 I. G. C. Hutchison, A political history of Scotland, 1832–1924: parties, elections and issues (Edinburgh,
1986), pp. 322, 325–8; see also idem, Scottish politics, p. 36.
23 Idem, Political history, p. 314.
24 Glasgow Herald, 2 Nov. 1922. The municipal poll was on 7 Nov. with the parliamentary contest
eight days later.
25 Hutchison, Political history, pp. 325–8; G. Brown, ‘The Labour party and political change in
Scotland: the politics of ﬁve elections’ (Ph.D., Edinburgh, 1982), pp. 335–40.
26 Glasgow Herald, 30 Dec. 1918.
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However, any sense of well being which this triumph encouraged proved to be
short-lived. Within a month Glasgow had embarked upon its most notorious
industrial dispute, the forty hours’ strike of January 1919, famously described by
the secretary of Scotland as ‘a Bolshevist rising ’.27 Whether or not the govern-
ment’s decision to send troops and tanks into Glasgow was ‘an exaggerated and
panicky reaction’, the strike certainly helped consolidate the city’s ‘ red ’ repu-
tation.28 Moreover, Glasgow’s particular radicalism existed within a national
context of uncertainty about the future. Wrigley has described the ‘special mood
in 1919 … a feeling, widespread in Britain, of fear, or of expectation, that major
social change was imminent’.29 While Wrigley identiﬁes early 1919 as the crucial
period, it is clear that, for Glasgow and the west of Scotland at any rate, fears
of labour’s advance, both electoral and industrial, remained at a high pitch for
some time thereafter.
It has been argued that the improvement in labour’s electoral fortunes, be-
ginning in the summer of 1919, helped deﬂate tensions by encouraging a new
conﬁdence in political progress through parliamentary means.30 However, it is
clear that much middle-class and propertied opinion was just as concerned at
the prospect of labour progress at the polls as it was of direct action. In his speech
to the ﬁrst annual general meeting of the Scottish Middle-Class Union, its
chairman, Sir William MacEwan, argued that only those who paid income tax
should have the vote, urged the government to cut back expenditure on education
and housing, and ‘said it would be well for them to organise now, for other and
more menacing strikes were threatening the community ’.31
While it would be mistaken to attach too much attention to this single organ-
ization, none the less, the plethora of such bodies is indicative of middle-class
fears and attitudes.32 Thus, the sentiments expressed above can be taken as rep-
resentative of middle-class desire for ‘economy’ in public expenditure – national
and local – and a rejection of any commitment to social reform and reconstruc-
tion. Such views found conﬁrmation in the columns and editorials of the Scottish
press, which was overwhelmingly unionist.33 The Glasgow Herald ’s attitude to
elections was one of motivating and directing the anti-labour vote. The following
diatribe was penned on the eve of the municipal poll of 1919 and is worth quoting
at length since it represents a common editorial outlook:
27 Quoted in I. McLean, The legend of red Clydeside (Edinburgh, 1983), p. 125.
28 Ibid., p. 120. For an alternative view of Glasgow’s industrial militancy see J. Foster, ‘Strike action
and working class politics on Clydeside, 1914–1919’, International Review of Social History, 35 (1990),
pp. 33–70. 29 Wrigley, Lloyd George, p. 13.
30 S. White, ‘ Ideological hegemony and political control : the sociology of anti-Bolshevism in
Britain 1918–20’, Scottish Labour History Society Journal, 9 (1975), pp. 3–20, at p. 14.
31 Glasgow Herald, 23 Oct. 1919.
32 On the burgeoning of anti-Bolshevik and pro-property organisations and their links with busi-
ness, see White, ‘ Ideological hegemony’ ; and Wrigley, Lloyd George, pp. 16–17.
33 I. G. C. Hutchison, ‘Scottish Unionism between the two world wars ’, in C. M. MacDonald, ed.,
Unionist Scotland, 1800–1997 (Edinburgh, 1998), pp. 81–2; idem, Scottish politics, pp. 31–2.
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A programme for the exploitation of the ‘Haves ’ in the interest of the ‘Have-Nots ’ will
never lack numerical backing. Panem et circenses has always been a good election cry, and the
mob will always hoist the tribune on its shoulder if he promises to give it something for
nothing … If they [the citizens] wish, as they ought to wish, to keep the taint of class
politics out of the City Chamber – and when all is said, the Labour movement in the
municipalities covers a deliberate attack on the middle class – they will deal trenchantly
with the men who are making Socialism and the advantage of the proletariat their aim.34
Such sentiments have to be placed alongside of any emphases on how after 1918
conservative rhetoric constructed a ‘national ’ interest or the ‘progressive ’ element
of unionism. Whatever eﬀorts may have been made to disseminate propaganda
directly, most people were likely to get their political impressions and opinions via
the press. More generally, as Davies and Morley have pointed out about the local
press in England and Wales, ‘ [it] tended to be stridently partisan in its coverage
and continually stress the ‘‘dangers of socialism’’ ’.35 The longevity and consist-
ency of this message, before as well as after the war, is worth noting. When labour
ﬁrst emerged as a local political presence in the 1890s the Herald fulminated
against ‘overwhelming schemes of municipalisation and conﬁscation ’, and when
labour ultimately secured victory in the 1930s, its stridency reached fever pitch :
‘Left-wing government will mean prejudiced class administration and an orgy of
extravagance. ’36
Labour’s electoral success continued into the autumn of 1919 throughout
Britain with further by-election successes and unprecedented gains at the mu-
nicipal polls. Labour returned candidates in areas that had previously been bar-
ren ground and even took control of a number of London boroughs.37 In Glasgow
Labour made four net gains, but preparations were being made for 1920 when
all three seats in every ward were to be contested.
The results in 1919, and the prospect of an actual socialist majority the fol-
lowing year, helped concentrate minds on how best to cope with the growing left-
wing presence. As early as May 1919 the Rotary Club had proposed a Good
Government League (GGL) for Glasgow and after the municipal election the
Citizens’ Union got involved in promoting a wider movement, ‘ to combat the
Socialist propaganda in Glasgow’.38 Although active in this ﬁeld prior to 1914,
it was recognized that the task was beyond the capacity of the Citizens’ Union
on its own and a provisional committee was formed of three delegates from
the Glasgow Unionist Association (GUA), the Glasgow Liberal Council, and the
Women’s Citizens’ Association.39 This committee in turn invited delegates
from other societies and among those joining were the Citizens’ Union, the
34 Glasgow Herald, 4 Nov. 1919. 35 Davies and Morley, County borough elections, p. 654.
36 Glasgow Herald, 8 Nov. 1893, 8 Nov. 1933. 37 Wrigley, Lloyd George, p. 245.
38 Glasgow Unionist Association (GUA), ‘minute book’, General Committee, 22 Dec. 1919. Scot-
tish Conservative and Unionist (SCUA) Archive, National Library of Scotland (NLS) ACC. 10424/73.
39 NLS, ‘Sir Lewis Shedden’s ﬁle relating to Glasgow municipal elections, 1896–1939’, ACC.
10424/9 (xii).
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Rotary Club, the City Business Club, the Citizens’ Vigilance Association, the
YMCA, the National Council of Women, and the Middle-Class Union.40
This umbrella organization was ﬁrst called the Glasgow Municipal Electors’
League but this was dissolved and replaced by the Glasgow Good Government
Committee (1920).41 The choice of title suggests a temporary initiative to coun-
ter labour’s expected assault on the town council in 1920.42 However, it soon
became a permanent feature and, as the GGL, was responsible for directing
the anti-socialist or ‘moderate ’ eﬀorts at the municipal elections. This it did with
notable success as the Moderate party controlled Glasgow corporation until
1933. The key to this achievement lay in avoiding any splits in the anti-labour
vote. The creation of the league permitted what was an eﬀective alliance of
unionists and liberals while maintaining the tradition of ‘no politics ’ in local
government.
Within the GUA there were some prominent members who desired to ﬁght
local contests directly under their own political colours.43 This group was led by
Sir Charles Cleland, chairman of the association, who harboured a long-standing
resentment at what he took to be the liberals’ eﬀective, though hidden, party
political approach to municipal aﬀairs. Although there were a number of eﬀorts,
going back to the 1890s and earlier, to get the party to run its own candidates,
these were always defeated by the wider membership.44 If the party as a whole
was happier with the no politics approach before 1914, it is hardly surprising
they were keen to maintain that strategy after the war. Thus, rather than follow
Cleland’s suggestion and ﬁght under their own colours, the Glasgow unionists
enthusiastically embraced the concept of a ‘broad front ’ in municipal aﬀairs
and successfully submitted the following resolution at the Scottish Conference
in October 1920:
That the time has come when the Unionist Associations throughout the country, should
actively concern themselves in Local Government Elections, and that, acting when possible
in combination with other non-Socialist Organisations, they should endeavour to secure
the return to Town and County Councils, Parish Councils, and Education Authorities
of men and women of sound progressive and anti-Socialist opinions.45
The Glasgow unionists, therefore, can be seen as providing a model for the
rest of Scotland and municipal contests in the Scottish cities remained largely
a duopoly between labour and moderates/progressives until the late 1960s when
40 Ibid. ; Hutchison, Political history, p. 321.
41 NLS, GUA, ‘minute book’, General Committee, 30 Aug. 1920, ACC. 10424/73. There is a
degree of confusion over titles as the Unionist Association minutes clearly refer to this as a ‘new body’,
while there would appear to be a deﬁnite connection with the Good Government Committee ﬁrst
established in 1919. 42 Glasgow Herald, 30 Sept. 1920.
43 NLS, GUA, ‘minute book’, General Committee, 26 Nov. 1919, ACC. 10424/73.
44 NLS, Shedden, ‘municipal ﬁle’, ACC. 10424/9 (xii).
45 NLS, GUA, ‘minute book’, General Committee, 30 Sept. 1920, ACC. 10424/73; Shedden,
‘municipal ﬁle ’, 10424/9 (xii).
382 J AM E S J. S M Y TH
the Conservative party eventually decided to contest elections under its own
banner.46
If the liberals remained a signiﬁcant force in local politics in Edinburgh, it is
diﬃcult to see them as other than very junior partners in Glasgow. The split in the
party was only formalized in 1920 and their organization deteriorated rapidly
thereafter.47 The only liberals successful in the 1918 general election in Glasgow
were coalition liberals but, by 1922, their constituency organization throughout
Scotland ‘was regarded as a paper ﬁction’.48 Certainly the liberals were involved
in the GGL. The original decision, ‘ to form an organisation non-political
but anti-Socialist ’, was taken jointly by the GUA and the coalition liberals, and
the chairman of the league was a prominent national liberal, P. M. Martin.49
Although some liberals withdrew and others did not join because they did not
want to alienate labour voters at the forthcoming temperance referendum, it
would appear that most liberals were happy with the arrangement.50 However,
gauging the extent of their practical contribution is more diﬃcult and it would
appear that their main role lay in helping sustain the ﬁction that the moderates
were ‘non-political ’.
The original constitution of the Municipal Electors’ League was regarded
by the GUA as too ‘nebulous and vague’. While they were prepared to sacriﬁce
doctrinal clarity for the sake of unity, the unionists pressed for a more deﬁnite
statement of opposition to socialism which, after all, ‘was the principal object for
which the formation of such a League was originally proposed’.51 The unionists
held sway and the league agreed to a new, explicitly anti-socialist clause in its
constitution, even though this led to the withdrawal of one of the constituent
groups.52 Why the league was dissolved and replaced by the Good Government
Committee is not clear, as there does not appear to have been any change in
policy, which remained that of consolidating the ‘moderate’ forces in the ﬁght
against labour, in particular avoiding moderate candidates standing against one
another. In the run-up to the election the Glasgow Herald described the league as
‘composed of representatives of the leading political parties, Unionist, Liberal
and Liberal Coalition, and of commercial, social, educational and religious
agencies ’.53
46 The terms ‘Moderate’ and ‘Progressive ’ were basically interchangeable. In Edinburgh, the
Progressive party was formed in 1928 and in Glasgow the moderates became the progressives in 1936.
Miller, ‘Politics in the Scottish city ’, p. 199.
47 ‘The most derelict of all areas was Glasgow itself. ’ Cook, Age of alignment, p. 35.
48 Hutchison, Political history, p. 321.
49 NLS, Shedden, ‘municipal ﬁle’, ACC. 10424/9 (xii) ; Glasgow Herald, 6 Oct. 1920, 22 Feb. 1929.
50 NLS, Shedden, ‘municipal ﬁle ’, ACC. 10424/9 (xii). The 1920 municipal election was held
simultaneously with a poll to determine the licensing arrangements in every war. Most wards voted
against the local veto and in favour of ‘no change’. See McLean, Legend, pp. 182–3.
51 NLS, GUA, ‘minute book’, General Committee, 26 Apr., 3 May 1920, ACC. 10424/73.
52 This was the Citizens’ Vigilance Association which was regarded by the Unionists as a Liberal
body. NLS, GUA, ‘minute book’, General Committee, 31 May 1920, ACC. 10424/73.
53 Glasgow Herald, 21 Oct. 1920.
R E S I S T I N G L A B OU R 383
Labour made signiﬁcant gains in 1920, winning seats in 18 of the City’s 37
wards, giving it 44 councillors out of a total of 111 elected, and presaging the
stunning success to come in the 1922 general election. However, given that the
unionists had feared labour was bidding ‘ to rule the city ’, the result was little
short of a triumph for the whole strategy of the moderate alliance.
When the GGL was established on a permanent basis, the GUA decided not to
aﬃliate.54 However, this decision did not represent a break in the broad front
approach or herald a move to running unionist candidates. Rather, the GUA,
through its own local elections sub-committee, co-operated with the GGL. The
closeness of the relationship can be seen during the 1925 polls. The two organiz-
ations agreed that the GUA issue to its membership (between 20,000 and 25,000)
its own circular and the manifesto of the league, with the recipients being ‘asked
to make themselves active in their own and neighbouring Wards, and to assist on
polling day’.55
Virtually all anti-labour candidates were designated ‘moderate ’ but the party
as such only existed within the Council chambers.56 Neither was the GGL a
surrogate party, as it had no full-time oﬃcials and concentrated its activities on
the period immediately prior to the polls.57 Its main function was to select suitable
candidates and to ensure that moderates did not stand against one another. In
this it was largely successful and in the 1920s it was labour which was more likely
to suﬀer from a split vote due to the competition from left-wing parties. After the
election of 1920 it was 1926 before rival moderates faced each other in contests
involving labour. The split in the Sandyford ward allowed labour to win the seat
(for the ﬁrst time) on a minority vote. The Glasgow Herald railed against this result
especially as the candidate recommended by the GGL got 1,000 votes more than
his moderate rival.58
Anti-socialism may have been an essentially negative message but it was cer-
tainly eﬀective. Unlike in parliamentary elections, labour proved incapable of
achieving a municipal majority. Rather than making continual progress after
1920, labour had apparently reached a plateau. There was little change in the
overall complexion of the corporation with the partial exception of 1926. In that
year, galvanized by the General Strike and the miners’ lockout, labour made
eight clear gains and pushed its representation to new heights. However, unlike
in Sheﬃeld where 1926 did prove to be the turning point when labour secured
control of the Council, in Glasgow there was no breakthrough and labour lost
most of its gains the following year.59 In 1930 the Glasgow Federation of the
54 NLS, GUA, ‘minute book’, General Committee, 30 May 1921, ACC. 10424/73.
55 Ibid., 25 Oct. 1925.
56 ‘The name Moderate has been adopted as covering all opponents of the Labour Programme’.
Glasgow Herald, 3 Nov. 1920. 57 NLS, Shedden, ‘municipal ﬁle ’, ACC. 10424/9 (xii).
58 Glasgow Herald, 4 Nov. 1926.
59 For Sheﬃeld see Thorpe, ‘Consolidation’, pp. 86–8, and H. K. Hawson, Sheﬃeld : the growth of a
City, 1832–1926 (Sheﬃeld, 1968), pp. 286–99. For Glasgow and the political impact of the General
Strike see Smyth, Labour in Glasgow, pp. 107–9.
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Independent Labour Party (ILP), looking back on a decade of trying to wrest
control of the Council from the moderates, sadly concluded, ‘No progress had
been made since 1920. ’60
I V
What were the factors, therefore, that lay behind the success of the moderates?
One was the actual electoral system. Apart from the most obvious discrepancy
between the age of qualiﬁcation for men and women, there remained the business
or plural vote, and the separate university seats.61 There was also the signiﬁcant
diﬀerence between the parliamentary and municipal franchises.
Whereas the Representation of the People Act established residence as the
qualiﬁcation for the parliamentary vote, occupation remained the qualiﬁcation
for the municipal vote.62 Of particular importance for our purposes here was
the diﬃculty young single men had getting on the municipal roll ; only 1 million
of the 4 million men given the parliamentary vote under the terms of the 1918
reform also qualiﬁed for the municipal vote. According to Tanner, this discrep-
ancy did not matter since there was no class bias operating: ‘As contemporaries
agreed, it was single people, of all classes who failed to qualify for the municipal
franchise. ’63 Elsewhere Tanner has compared municipal and parliamentary
election results in 1922 for a group of English and Welsh constituencies and
four Glasgow divisions. He estimates that labour polled between 1 and 2 per cent
better in parliamentary contests and the conservatives between 1 and 2 per cent
worse in municipal contests, and links this to the former’s greater ‘appeal to the
young’.64
However, a detailed examination of the diﬀerence between municipal and
parliamentary electoral registers has been undertaken by Davies in his study of
labour in Liverpool. While careful not to assume that being working class auto-
matically translated into voting labour (especially in Liverpool) he does suggest
that it was ‘working-class voters who were more likely to be excluded from the
municipal franchise ’, and that such exclusion ‘was more likely to disadvantage
labour than any other party ’.65 Moreover, Davies also examines municipal ward
boundaries and size of electorates, and clearly shows that labour strongholds had
substantially higher electorates than those wards they were weakest in.66 An
examination of the Glasgow wards shows a similar broad picture. By contrasting
the ten wards which labour was most successful in during the 1920s with the
60 Glasgow ILP Federation, ‘minute book’, Management Committee, 23 May 1930. Mitchell
Library, Glasgow 891745.
61 M. Dyer, Capable citizens and improvident democrats : the Scottish electoral system, 1884–1929 (Aberdeen,
1996), p. 105. 62 M. Pugh, Electoral reform in war and peace, 1906–1918 (London, 1978), p. 112.
63 D. Tanner, Political change and the Labour party, 1900–1918 (Cambridge, 1990), p. 389.
64 D. Tanner, ‘Elections, statistics, and the rise of the Labour party, 1906–1931 ’, Historical Journal,
34 (1991), pp. 883–908, at pp. 906–7.
65 S. Davies, Liverpool labour : social and political inﬂuences of the development of the Labour party in Liverpool,
1900–1939 (Keele, 1996), pp. 125–6. 66 Ibid., pp. 101–9.
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fourteen wards where the moderates won every single seat over the same period,
we can see that labour wards had noticeably higher electorates and numbers of
voters per seat. In 1922 the number of voters per seat in the labour and moderate
wards were 4,743 and 3,984 respectively, though six years later, the gap had
been reduced: 3,894 compared with 4,286.67 Labour was, therefore, under-
represented but not to the same extent as in Liverpool where the diﬀerence was
much greater and grew wider over the same period.
However, labour’s main complaint was over qualiﬁcation for the franchise
which it clearly felt deprived the party of potential votes. The Scottish council
of the Labour party took issue with the 1918 legislation over the treatment of
lodgers, and claimed that the situation was worse than before. Labour also
pointed out the absurdity of single and married women being treated diﬀerently
and was to call repeatedly for a simpliﬁed register based on adult suﬀrage for
national and local elections.68 William Regan, the Glasgow ILP organizer and
a town councillor, spelt out the electoral impact much more clearly :
The Parliamentary register is inﬁnitely more favourable to Labour than the Municipal
Register. Thousands of young men (and they are usually Labour supporters) are entitled to
the Parliamentary vote on reaching 21, but are disfranchised at the local poll through the
absence of a property qualiﬁcation. Again, in the middle-class parts of every Ward there
are large houses comprising young ladies who qualify for the Municipal vote through their
property, but who being under 30 years have no Parliamentary vote. These well-to-do
young ladies are usually anti-Labour.69
Regan’s arguments were based on a close knowledge of the city’s electoral regis-
ters in which there were always some tens of thousands fewer municipal voters
than there were parliamentary. This was partly due to the fact that some parts of
the municipal burgh lay out with the parliamentary boundaries. However, there
were interesting variations between the diﬀerent parts of the city. In middle-class
areas there was little discrepancy between the two electorates, if anything more
people had the municipal vote than the parliamentary, and all the middle-class
wards had a majority female electorate.70 In contrast the working-class areas
had considerably fewer people on the municipal register compared to the par-
liamentary and these wards had a predominantly male electorate. There are
inter-related matters of class, gender, and age involved here, but it is interesting to
note that Regan’s view of young men being labour-inclined gives support to
the recent article by Childs on the propensity of young workers to vote labour.71
67 Figures taken from the Glasgow Post Oﬃce Directory 1922–3 and 1928–9.
68 Scottish Advisory Council of the Labour Party, Report of Fourth Annual Conference 1918, p. 4. See also
Report 1919, pp. 11, 45–6, and Report 1921, p. 37. This contrasts with the virtual silence of labour in
Liverpool over the electoral system. See Davies, Liverpool labour, pp. 153–63.
69 Forward, 13 Nov. 1920; Brown, ‘Labour party’, p. 142.
70 High female electorates were a sign of middle-class areas. See J. Turner, British politics and the Great
War : coalition and conﬂict, 1915–1918 (London, 1992), pp. 412–14.
71 M. Childs, ‘Labour grows up: the electoral system, political generations, and British politics,
1890–1929’, Twentieth Century British History, 6 (1995), pp. 123–44.
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Labour in Glasgow certainly felt that the franchise had direct political conse-
quences. The Maryhill division comprised three wards that proved to be stony
ground for labour at local elections in the 1920s. In one labour never managed
a single victory, and in the other two only occasional successes. In contrast,
labour secured the parliamentary seat in 1922, 1923, and 1929. The unionist victory
in 1924 was due to liberal non-intervention, but there was more to it than that. In
1922 labour calculated that, on the basis of municipal results, it could expect a
vote of over 10,000. However, in addition to these municipal voters, there were
an additional 3,640 category ‘D’ electors in the division, that is ‘young men who
have only the Parliamentary vote’. Labour felt ‘conﬁdent of capturing the young
men’s vote’, and its calculations proved to be accurate as it took the seat with
13,058 votes.72 A similar pattern occurred in the constituencies of Camlachie
and Tradeston ; the moderates dominated the municipal wards but Labour took
both divisions at all four general elections in the 1920s.
Maryhill and Camlachie both had a middle-class ward where labour rarely
bothered to challenge, whereas Tradeston had two wards – Kingston and Kin-
ning Park – which were always contested. Labour lost regularly in the latter,
and shared the representation in the former. However, labour held the parlia-
mentary seat by large majorities throughout the 1920s, whether in three-way
contests or straight ﬁghts with the unionist. In 1922 labour polled 55.7 per cent
at the general election but only 48.8 per cent at the municipal contest. In 1924
the respective labour polls were 56.0 per cent compared to 50.3 per cent, and
in 1929 57.9 per cent compared to 51.5 per cent.73 This gap (5–7 per cent) between
labour’s share of the parliamentary and municipal polls is signiﬁcantly larger
than that identiﬁed by Tanner, and suggests that the exclusion of young male
workers from the local franchise may have played a crucial role. Another gap
existed, that between the turnout in national and local elections. Since munici-
pal polls could be up to 20 per cent less that parliamentary, it may be that this
could explain labour’s weaker performance in the former. Direct comparisons
are problematic because of the number of uncontested returns in middle-class
wards, but examination of Kingston and Kinning Park which were contested
every year would suggest that turnout had little, if any, direct impact upon
results.74
If the vagaries of the electoral system favoured the moderates, that was not the
only reason for their success. The party achieved a high degree of unity and
discipline through the gentlemen’s agreements achieved via the GGL and, as
72 Forward, 2 Dec. 1922.
73 Election data taken from Craig, Parliamentary election results, and Glasgow Herald.
74 Labour’s single victory in Kinning Park between 1921 and 1931 occurred on a poll of 57.3 per
cent, compared to an average poll of 56.0 per cent. In Kingston labour’s seven victories were achieved
on an average poll of 57.0 per cent, while the moderates’ four victories were secured on an average of
58.5 per cent. Tanner has commented on the diﬀerent turnout between national and local politics, and
does not ﬁnd it a convincing explanation of labour’s better performance at parliamentary elections.
Tanner, ‘Rise of labour’, p. 907.
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we have seen, it was rare for rival moderates to stand against one another. The
eﬀectiveness of the GGL and the GUA in placing candidates meant that
labour always had to defend its seats, whereas the moderates enjoyed a large
number of uncontested returns. At the same time labour suﬀered from split votes
more often, as in 1927 when it lost in Govan and Parkhead, both traditional
strongholds.75
It is clear that, in Glasgow as in other urban centres in Britain, local politics
became polarized very quickly after the war. This was so in Sheﬃeld where
the ‘Citizens ’ Alliance, uniting conservative and liberal, stood so ﬁrmly on
middle-class lines. ’76 It was also the case in other towns where no ‘ front ’ party
was formed. Davies and Morley have commented on this period that ‘ the sig-
niﬁcance of class in municipal politics stands out ’, and this was the case regardless
of what form the various anti-labour alliances took.77 The geographic manifes-
tation of this political antagonism was expressed in the aﬃliation of the various
wards of the city. Labour and the moderates entrenched themselves in particular
heartlands ; labour in what were clearly working-class districts and the moderates
in middle-class, residential areas. However, two points are important to note.
One is that the moderates had a signiﬁcantly larger number of secure seats
than did labour; fourteen wards returned moderates exclusively throughout the
1920s, while only ﬁve were similarly labour inclined. Secondly, there were a
number of working-class wards where the moderates could and did win seats on
a regular basis, and we shall discuss these in more detail below.
In the absence of other census data at the ward level, particularly on occu-
pations, housing conditions can be utilized to provide a correlation between class
and politics.78 The number of persons per room for 1921 related to the political
loyalties for each ward over the period 1920–30 illustrates an expected relation-
ship. As Table 1 shows, the ﬁfteen wards with the lowest number of persons per
room (i.e. lower than the ﬁgure for the whole burgh) were all solidly moderate,
while the ten wards with the highest number of persons per room (or greatest
degree of overcrowding) were either solidly or predominantly labour.79 In the
ﬁfteen better housed wards, the moderates won every single seat bar two at the
municipal elections between 1920 and 1930. To these need to be added Exchange,
part of the business centre with a high level of plural votes, and exclusively
moderate, and Kinning Park, where labour’s single success was in the exceptional
year of 1926. In the ten worst housed wards, labour enjoyed solid success in six
while it was only predominant in the other four. In these the moderates could
and did make occasional gains.
75 An account of the moderate candidate’s unexpected victory in Parkhead is given in his autobi-
ography. Captain H. J. Moss, Windjammer to Westminster (London, 1941), pp. 131–8.
76 Thorpe, ‘Consolidation’, p. 86; see also Mathers, ‘City of Sheﬃeld’, p. 76.
77 Davies and Morley, ‘County borough elections’, p. 654.
78 See Cook, Age of alignment, pp. 83–4; and Miller, ‘Politics in the Scottish city ’, pp. 202–3. Both
authors use census data on numbers of persons per room.
79 Data taken from Report on the Thirteenth Census of Scotland, I, Part 2: City of Glasgow, p. 53, Table 4.
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Partick East 156 Mod
Sandyford 158 Mod
Partick West 162 Mod
Govanhill 173 Mod





















Mile End 264 Lab
Dalmarnock 272 Lab
Lab=wholly or almost wholly Labour
Mod=wholly or almost wholly Moderate
L*=representation divided but mostly Labour
M*=representation divided but mostly Moderate
Source : Report on the Thirteenth Census of Scotland, I, Part 2 : City of Glasgow, p. 53, Table 4.
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While housing conditions seem to explain the conﬂicting political loyalties
in the diﬀerent areas of the city, they do not explain everything.80 Of particular
concern are the marginal wards that lay between the two extremes, because it
was here where political control of the city lay ultimately. Unlike in English mu-
nicipalities, the complexion of the corporation was not confused by the presence
of aldermen; other than the elected councillors there were only two ex-oﬃcio
members. There were thirty-seven wards returning 111 elected members ; seven-
teen safe wards left the moderates just short of a majority, but they were usually
more than twenty seats ahead of labour. It was their ability to regularly win seats
in what were largely working-class areas that secured moderate control.
For instance, Provan was more or less equally divided between moderate
and labour in the 1920s, yet it had the fourth highest level of overcrowding in the
city. Other predominantly working-class wards with higher than average over-
crowding where the moderates enjoyed the majority representation were Town-
head, Whitevale, Ruchill and Maryhill. Maryhill had exactly the same number
of persons per room as did Fairﬁeld and Govan (2.17) yet, while they were solidly
labour, Maryhill returned a moderate at every poll bar one between 1921 and
1931.
V
It is clear that there was a signiﬁcant working-class unionist vote in Glasgow.
Part of that unionist identity comprised an instinctive antipathy towards the Irish
or, to be more precise, the Catholic-Irish. Orangeism had long been a crucial
element to working-class toryism, with the Orange order having direct represen-
tation on the western division and Glasgow association.81 Although this formal
relationship came to an end in 1922 when the Orange order withdrew in protest
at the signing of the Anglo-Irish Treaty, and there is evidence of the unionists
distancing themselves from the Orange die-hards in order to better cultivate
middle-class liberals, the link was to remain strong even after 1922.82
There is a popular tendency to associate the ethnic and racial sectarianism in
Glasgow as a working-class phenomenon, sustained by the rivalry between the
two big football clubs of Rangers and Celtic, but in the inter-war period anti-Irish
prejudice became much more pronounced and cannot be identiﬁed solely with
plebeian Orangemen. Prominent politicians, churchmen, intellectuals, even the
aristocracy all contributed to the growing perception of the Catholic-Irish as
a threat, not just to the established Protestant religion, but to the ‘Scottish race ’
itself. The sources of what was an increasingly bitter intolerance were varied.
80 See Smyth, Labour in Glasgow, pp. 30–1, for a more detailed picture of the municipal wards.
81 Hutchison, Political history, p. 23 ; J. Mitchell, Conservatives and the union; a study of Conservative party
attitudes to Scotland (Edinburgh, 1990), p. 39: E. McFarland, Protestants ﬁrst : Orangeism in nineteenth century
Scotland (Edinburgh, 1990), p. 213.
82 G.Walker, ‘The Orange Order in Scotland between the wars ’, International Review of Social History,
37 (1992), pp. 185–9.
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Anti-Catholic and anti-Irish feelings were hardly new to Scotland. Traditional
Presbyterian hostility to the papacy, concern at the apparently ingrained poverty
of Irish immigrants, and the increasing importance of the Home Rule question
all served to make the matter a live issue prior to 1914. After the Great War,
however, it was to become more signiﬁcant.83
In spite of the fact that the Irish-Catholic community was as eager in its
patriotism as everyone else during the conﬂict, the Easter Rising made Irish a
synonym for treachery. Support for Sinn Fein in 1918 and the subsequent War
of Independence only served to conﬁrm this judgement. Moreover, the 1918
Education Act, which brought Catholic schools within the state system in Scot-
land while guaranteeing their religious character, provoked considerable op-
position, expressed in the cry of ‘No Rome on the Rates ’. Although the Labour
party had no responsibility for the Act, its general willingness to accept the re-
ality of denominational schooling encouraged an identiﬁcation of labour and
Catholic. In addition, a constant refrain at the time was the direct link between
industrial and political militancy and Irish republicanism.
The Church of Scotland was intensely anti-labour during the inter-war years
and blamed the Irish for returning the ‘Clydeside ’ group of MPs in 1922, as well
as identifying the labour leadership as mostly Irish.84 Similarly, Sir Robert Horne,
speaking about the ‘Irish invasion’ just before the 1931 election, declared that
the Irish accounted for 25 per cent of the population of Glasgow but caused most
of the city’s problems. They were
responsible for the class of representation they got, and most of the trouble which arrived
in their midst … There were very few people who wanted to come to the Clydeside to
establish industries unless they could demonstrate that they were not being over-ridden
by the Irish revolutionaries in their midst.85
It must be emphasized that these views were not the expressions of a small min-
ority of unionist politicians and conservative churchmen. Such attitudes were
commonplace and, indeed, can be seen as forming part of the ‘commonsense’ of
unionist and middle-class opinion. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s there was
a continuous church-led campaign against Irish immigration. The term ‘ in-
vasion’ was constantly employed and claims made that Irish labourers were
being given jobs ahead of Scottish workers, and that Irish paupers were deliber-
ately targeting Scottish parish councils.86 Despite the fact that the numbers of
Irish immigrants were utterly insigniﬁcant after the war, the economic depression
provided the soil in which sectarianism could ﬂourish and become politically
signiﬁcant in a way it had never been previously.
83 See T. Gallagher, Glasgow the uneasy peace : religious tension in modern Scotland (Manchester, 1987),
p. 136; S. J. Brown, ‘ ‘‘Outside the covenant ’’ : the Scottish Presbyterian churches and Irish immi-
gration, 1922–1938’, Innes Review, 42 (1991), pp. 19–45.
84 Brown, ‘Outside the Covenant’, pp. 26–8; and S. J. Brown, ‘The social vision of Scottish Pres-
byterianism and the Union of 1929’, Records of the Scottish Church History Society, 24 (1992), pp. 92–3.
85 Glasgow Observer, 24 Oct. 1931. 86 Brown, ‘Outside the Covenant’.
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Many leading unionists were also active Orangemen, such as Sir Charles
Cleland, Archibald McInnes Shaw, grand master of the Order in Scotland and
Unionist MP, and Sir John Gilmour, secretary of state between 1924 and 1929.
Others, such as Lord Scone, were renowned for their bigotry. Many churchmen
played a prominent role in the order which shared many of the same political
concerns expressed by the Protestant churches. Thus the order was violently
opposed to industrial militancy and to the Labour party, it associated bolshevism
with catholicism, campaigned against the 1918 Education Act, and called for
‘Scots ’ workers to be given preference over the ‘Irish ’.87 Orangeism cannot be
equated with Protestantism – if that were the case, Labour would never have won
any seats in Scotland. And it would appear that the ‘Orange’ vote, like the ‘Irish ’
in Scotland, was not so monolithic or as easily directed by its leaders as those
leaders would have liked to think.88 None the less, in identifying a working-class
pro-unionist and pro-moderate vote, the religious question would appear to be
critical.
Hostile references to Irish Catholics occur frequently within the unionist min-
utes. Just as in the churches, complaints were made about the numbers of Irish
coming to Scotland, becoming chargeable to the parish, or getting work with the
corporation.89 Regardless of the lack of evidence it was stated as fact that Irish
migrants were given preferential treatment in employment and were a drain on
the poor rate. It was questioned whether encouraging emigration as a response
to long-term unemployment was a wise idea since it left, ‘an open ﬁeld for the
Irish, whose desire it was to gain the country for Roman Catholicism’.90 Neither
the unionists nor moderates were sectarian organizations. There were no formal
barriers to Catholics joining or being selected as candidates. But neither case
was very likely or likely to lead to success. In 1930 there was a complaint about
the selection by the GGL of a Catholic to stand in Govan, and it was claimed
this had cost, ‘many Protestant votes ’.91
V I
At the beginning of the 1930s the moderate majority remained secure, but there
were certain indicators that it was not as impregnable as before. It was becoming
more diﬃcult to get candidates to contest labour’s more secure seats. Although
these were usually hopeless from the moderate point of view, keeping labour
on the defensive was regarded as a civic duty, and it was good experience for
young men who were interested in political careers.92 Moreover, ﬁnance was
harder to come by. More and more moderate candidates now expected to have
their election expenses paid rather than meet them out of their own pocket. The
87 Walker, ‘Orange Order’, pp. 182–5.
88 Ibid., pp. 189–94. On the Irish vote see Smyth, Labour in Glasgow, ch. 4.
89 NLS, GUA, ‘minute book’, General Committee, 29 Nov. 1926, ACC. 10424/73.
90 Ibid., 29 Aug. 1927. 91 Ibid., 24 Nov. 1930.
92 Ibid., 25 Feb., 7 Oct., 28 Oct. 1929; Hutchison, Scottish politics, p. 47.
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GGL therefore had greater demands placed on it and, in turn, was less able to
help the Unionists as it normally did. The death of Martin, the Liberal who, ‘ for
many years had been the backbone’ of the league, made matters ‘critical ’.93
The incipient crisis was not just ﬁnancial. Successful as they had been in saving
Glasgow from socialism, the moderates had been helpless in halting the inexor-
able decline of the ‘Second City ’. The almost permanent depression that had
settled over the capital goods sector placed the corporation in a desperate pos-
ition, as social expenditure rose dramatically, while the local tax base shrank.
Business opinion grew increasingly critical of the perceived ‘extravagance ’ of
Glasgow’s spending.
The demand for economy was nothing new, it was the raison d’eˆtre of the
original moderate alliance after all, but the complaints became more insistent
and critical. The major issue around which middle-class opinion united was the
rates. The moderates had proven their worth by reducing the total combined
municipal rate bill from an historic high point in the immediate post-war years.
However, by the later 1920s the rates had begun to creep up again, and in early
1928, the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce was calling not only for retrenchment
in civic expenditure, but the appointment of an outside ‘expert ’ to oversee the
ﬁnancial administration of the corporation. The failure of the corporation to
respond – it simply let the Chamber’s resolutions ‘ lie on the table ’ – caused
something of a crisis in relations between the two bodies.94
Once the impact of the Great Slump kicked in, the city’s already bad unem-
ployment ﬁgures worsened dramatically with a concomitant increased pressure
upon public services. The moderates were facing the same dilemma locally as
the Labour party was nationally, and like the government it faced political con-
straints and consequences whatever decisions it took. For the majority of mod-
erate councillors sitting in safe middle-class wards, there was plenty to be gained
by supporting calls and initiatives for cuts in expenditure and, therefore, lower
rates. Moderates who represented working-class constituencies, however, had
to be more circumspect and balance general support for ‘economy’ with re-
sponsiveness to speciﬁc working-class issues.
Such latent tensions came to a head in 1930 over the issue of granting twelve
days paid holiday for municipal employees. At the usual moderate group meet-
ing a decision was taken to oppose the proposal, but at the subsequent corpor-
ation meeting ten councillors broke ranks and voted in favour. This threatened
the whole basis of the party as loyalist members publicly questioned the sense of
maintaining their allegiance in such a situation and others threatened to ‘act
on their own’.95 Three members were expelled from the party, even though in
their defence it was stated that the extent of the dissension had been made clear
and it was known there would be ‘a considerable defection’ at the vote.96 The
93 NLS, GUA, ‘minute book’, General Committee, 25 Feb. 1929, ACC. 10424/74.
94 Glasgow Herald, 28 Feb., 27 Mar. 1928. 95 Ibid., 14 June 1920.
96 Ibid., 19 June 1930.
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expelled councillors represented the wards of Cowlairs, Whitevale, and Govan-
hill. Cowlairs was predominantly labour where the single moderate councillor
was defending his seat, Whitevale was predominantly moderate, but with worse
overcrowding than the Gorbals, and Govanhill was a safe moderate ward which
had been a long-term target of labour.
By 1933 relations between the moderates and their core middle-class supporters
were becoming poisonous. The rate was set in August and, in spite of identifying
some minor economies, the corporation was circumscribed by its statutory ob-
ligations, especially over public assistance, and an increase of 1s 6d was an-
nounced. Business opinion was outraged with the Glasgow Property Owners’ and
Factors’ Association particularly vociferous and it helped launch a campaigning
body, the Glasgow Association for Rents Reduction and Civic Eﬃciency. There
was some recognition of the extent of the unemployment problem and the
need for national government to absorb more of the ﬁnancial burden; however,
the most popular demand involved an extension of the old Chamber of Com-
merce demand that government appoint commissioners to take control of the
corporation.97
V I I
The moderates, therefore, were in a quandary. In order to retain power they had
to win at least some of the working-class wards, but the worsening economic
conditions and the insistent middle-class demands for retrenchment made it
much more diﬃcult to maintain their support in every area. Into this increasingly
tense situation entered the nemesis of the moderates in the unlikely shape of one
Alexander Ratcliﬀe, head of the militantly anti-Catholic Scottish Protestant
League (SPL). Ratcliﬀe was ﬁrst active in Edinburgh and was elected to the
Education Authority there in 1925. At the 1929 general election he contested
Stirling and Falkirk burghs as an independent, and, although coming last, polled
over 20 per cent of the votes. The following year he moved to Glasgow, estab-
lished his own church, and was soon to launch a political movement that was
as signiﬁcant as it was short-lived.98
The SPL ran three candidates at the local elections in 1931, winning two seats
and securing over 12,000 votes. Success came in Dalmarnock, a safe labour seat,
where Charles Forrester, an ex-communist, triumphed, and in Dennistoun, an
equally safe moderate seat, where Ratcliﬀe topped the poll. Both major parties
therefore had either as much or as little to be worried about. It was not clear
exactly what long-term impact the SPL might have and the Glasgow Herald was
97 Ibid., 11, 18, 22, 24 Aug., 28 Sept. 1933.
98 The story of Ratcliﬀe and his SPL is expertly told in Gallagher, Uneasy peace, pp. 150–7. See also
the same author’s ‘Protestant extremism in urban Scotland, 1920–1939: its growth and contraction’,
Scottish Historical Review, 64 (1985), pp. 143–67; and S. Bruce, No Pope of Rome:anti-Catholicism in modern
Scotland (Edinburgh, 1985).
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satisﬁed simply to comment that the league’s ‘participation in the fray introduced
the hot spirit of faction. ’99
The moderate majority remained untouched and was given a boost the fol-
lowing year when, as a result of the ILP’s decision to disaﬃliate from the Labour
party, civil war broke out in the Labour ranks. The majority of the Scottish ILP
was opposed to disaﬃliation and shortly after the Bradford Conference they set
up the Scottish Socialist party (SSP), which took over the running of the Labour
campaign. In twenty-one wards they faced their former comrades standing di-
rectly under the ﬂag of the ILP. The consequences of this dispute could have been
catastrophic but the overall ‘ left ’ representation did not fall. Labour and the ILP
tended to cancel each other out and, in spite of the occasional spat, left each other
alone with the latter having around ten councillors for the rest of the decade.100
The 1932 contests were further complicated by a more substantial intervention
by the SPL, which stood in eleven wards and won an extra seat. The real shock,
and the SPL’s lasting claim to fame, was to occur the following year. In the 1933
elections the SPL stood in twenty-three wards, won four seats, and gained 23 per
cent of the total vote. This represented a real show of strength which almost
matched the performance of the moderates who polled only marginally more
than the SPL, even though they stood in twenty-seven wards. For the ruling party
the results were a disaster. They lost seventeen seats in total and overall control
of the corporation. That labour was now in a position to form an administration
came as a surprise. Prior to the election it had already put the blame for not
achieving a majority ﬁrmly at the door of the ILP and the Communist party
for creating ‘criminal confusion’ in the minds of the working-class electors by
running their own candidates.101 The labour victory or, to be more precise, the
moderate defeat, was due overwhelmingly to one single factor, Ratcliﬀe and his
league.
V I I I
The moderates lost seventeen seats – an unprecedented number at a single elec-
tion. Only in one ward – Provan – did labour win in a straight ﬁght with the
moderates. In all the others the intervention of the SPL proved crucial. The four
seats gained by it were in safe moderate wards, three of which were not contested
by labour or the ILP in 1933. This may have been a deliberate tactic as labour
was aware that the SPL threatened the moderates more, ‘because of the rivalry
for the Orange vote ’.102 Damaging as it was for the moderates to lose these
seats, more signiﬁcant were the twelve wards lost to labour and the ILP due to
SPL intervention.
In four of these wards labour was usually the dominant party, the moderates
usually dominated another three, while the remaining ﬁve were essentially safe
99 Glasgow Herald, 4 Nov. 1931. 100 See Smyth, Labour in Glasgow, pp. 190–4.
101 Forward, 4 Nov. 1933. 102 Ibid.
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moderate wards. After the election Ratcliﬀe boasted that, ‘ if the Socialists have a
majority in Glasgow Town Council, they have the Scottish Protestant League to
thank for it ’.103 The extent of labour’s debt to the SPL can be gauged from the
fact that in all twelve seats bar one, the combined moderate and protestant
vote was greater than the winning labour or ILP vote. And in the one case,
Maryhill, where labour had an overall majority, it was by six votes. In sharp con-
trast the SPL failed to register any gains against labour. There were ﬁve wards
where labour or the ILP were the incumbents, targeted by the SPL. In none
of these seats were there oﬃcial moderate candidates, though independent
moderates came forward in all bar Dalmarnock where, adding to the confusion,
an independent protestant stood also. If this was a ploy by the moderates to
encourage the SPL at the expense of labour it backﬁred badly. Though the SPL
candidates polled heavily, labour and the ILP held their seats quite comfortably.
The scale of the SPL vote in a variety of wards showed that it was capable
of attracting a wide range of support throughout the city. Invariably, the con-
tests with the highest turnouts were those involving the SPL. The size of the
‘protestant ’ vote in working-class wards and its victory in Dalmarnock in 1931,
showed that labour could not aﬀord to be too sanguine about the SPL threat
to its own position. None the less, there can be little doubt that it was from
among moderate electors that the SPL gained most of its votes. Six of its seven
seats were in wards that, up to then, had been secure moderate seats and which
have been described as ‘ lower middle class districts ’.104 While wards such as
Kinning Park and Govanhill were a mix of working class and lower middle class,
Camphill, Cathcart, and even Langside, where the SPL polled heavily in 1933,
were more solidly middle class. Sectarianism was not, therefore, simply an ex-
pression of working-class antagonisms but enjoyed a healthy support in the gen-
teel suburbs.
Having successfully established itself as the power broker in Glasgow’s mu-
nicipal politics, the SPL began to self-destruct. The only discipline on its coun-
cillors was that they vote together on religious issues. Otherwise, the majority,
including Ratcliﬀe, normally voted with Labour while two usually supported the
moderates. The main problem lay with Ratcliﬀe himself and his determination to
retain absolute control of the movement. This led to personality clashes and four
of his erstwhile comrades left and presented themselves to the electorate as in-
dependent Protestants.105 In 1934 the SPL only managed to ﬁeld seven candidates
and, though they all polled respectably, none were returned. Most damagingly
of all, Ratcliﬀe lost his own seat in Dennistoun, though given a clear run by the
moderates. Despite his claims to be a reformer, Ratcliﬀe came to an arrangement
with the moderates prior to the November election. With the SPL disintegrating
beneath him, Ratcliﬀe could not mobilize the same forces as the year before,
while the moderates saw such a pact as necessary to regain the ground lost to
103 The Vanguard, 15 Nov. 1933, quoted in NLS, Shedden ‘municipal ﬁle ’, ACC. 10424/9 (xii).
104 Gallagher, Uneasy peace, p. 153. 105 Ibid., pp. 153–4, 156.
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Labour. The unionists explained the arrangement as a means of ‘avoiding a split
of the Protestant vote ’.106
However, the result was another disaster for the moderates with labour en-
trenching its hold on power. Labour took four seats from the moderates, while the
ILP took one each from the moderates and protestants. For the moderates salt
was rubbed in the wound when an ex-councillor and Kirk elder, standing as
an independent moderate without labour or ILP opposition, and, with Catholic
support, defeated Ratcliﬀe by 341 votes.107 With this result the SPL more or less
disappeared as a signiﬁcant political force. Its remaining councillors and those
who chose to label themselves independent Protestants were defeated in sub-
sequent elections and Ratcliﬀe failed to get back on the Council when he was
defeated in Camphill in 1937.
The storm centre of militant Protestantism now shifted to Edinburgh where
a new grouping, Protestant Action, led by one John Cormack, made its break-
through just as the SPL was falling apart in Glasgow. More violent than the SPL,
in 1936 Protestant Action gained over 30 per cent and relegated Labour to third
place overall. Thereafter, Cormack overstretched himself and his movement
rapidly declined, though he regained his seat on the Council and held it until
1962.108
In Edinburgh the progressive majority over Labour was so massive that Prot-
estant Action could barely dent it. What the moderates experienced in Glasgow,
however, was a critical haemorrhage of key supporters. If we accept for the
moment that the Glasgow unionists were correct in their view that there was a
distinct ‘protestant ’ vote which was pro-moderate, we can see that vote declining.
In 1933 the combined moderate–SPL vote was 52.5 per cent but fell to 46.4 per
cent in 1934. The combined labour–ILP vote on the other hand rose from 42.8 to
51 per cent. The almost compete disappearance of the SPL thereafter, however,
was of only marginal beneﬁt to the moderates. The strategy of attempting to unite
the ‘protestant ’ vote in 1934 had failed and it would appear that the SPL acted as
a conduit for a signiﬁcant number of electors to transfer their allegiance over to
labour. This becomes more apparent when we look at the political complexion of
particular wards.
A number of the wards lost by the moderates either to the SPL or to labour
quickly returned to the fold with the demise of Ratcliﬀe’s party. These were
middle-class wards, Camphill, Cathcart, Dennistoun, Pollokshaws, Whiteinch,
which had been solidly moderate and became so again almost immediately. In
Partick West and Whitevale, which had large working-class populations, rep-
resentation became divided between the two parties. Of more signiﬁcance are
those wards that were lost to labour in 1933, courtesy of the SPL, and remained
labour thereafter. This group comprised Kingston, Kinning Park, Maryhill,
106 NLS, GUA, ‘minute book’, Local Elections Sub-committee, 22 Oct. 1934, ACC. 10424/74.
107 Gallagher, Uneasy peace, pp. 156–7.
108 For a detailed account of Protestant Action see T. Gallagher, Edinburgh divided (Edinburgh, 1987).
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Ruchill, Townhead, and Woodside. Two of these wards had been more or less
solidly pro-moderate, two had been predominantly moderate, and the remaining
two had been predominantly labour with occasional moderate successes. After
1932 the moderates never won a seat in any of them for the rest of the 1930s.
The presence of a large Orange vote in Maryhill had been regarded previously
as a cause of labour’s poor performance there. That labour now held the ward
comfortably suggests that either signiﬁcant numbers of protestant voters switched
to labour or no longer saw voting moderate as an overwhelming priority.
While it is clear that local politics in Glasgow were primarily a struggle between
labour and unionist, the strategy of the latter remained that of maintaining the
moderate alliance. This became more diﬃcult with the winding up of the GGL
in 1933.109 The unionist response was not to run their own candidates but to seek
to establish another such umbrella organization. To this end a Municipal Society
was formed, although it was soon to exhibit the weaknesses of the GGL, namely
that it had no full-time organization and only came sporadically to life in the
weeks prior to the November polls. In 1936 the Municipal Society was in turn
replaced by the Glasgow Progressive party with its own oﬃce and full-time
staﬀ.110 Attempts were made to involve prominent industrial ﬁgures, and in order
to sustain the non-party basis of the new organization, Councillor James Gray,
a liberal, was appointed chairman.111
Reﬂecting the common view that the GGL had failed to sustain enough cam-
paigning between elections, the Progressive party started oﬀ with some very
ambitious plans. There was to be a branch or ‘unit ’ in every ward, special rep-
resentation for ‘youth’ and for ‘weekly wage earners ’. Whatever the latter two
points intended, the ﬁrst was a step too far for the unionists. Keen as they were to
co-operate in the struggle against labour, the plan for Progressive party ward
committees sounded suspiciously like a direct political rival and the Unionist
associations vetoed the idea.112 To all intents and purposes, therefore, the Pro-
gressive party was simply a continuation of the Moderate party.
The 1936 election was crucial since all the gains made by labour in 1933 would
have to be defended. The progressives made seven net gains, retaking all four
SPL seats. Apart from winning Shettleston oﬀ the ILP, however, none of its gains
was unexpected and labour still held on to the other wards it had taken three
years before. A single progressive gain was made in 1937 but, with no change in
1938, labour’s majority remained secure on the outbreak of war.
I X
After the defeat of the moderates in 1933 the unionists, not surprisingly, laid the
blame squarely at the door of the SPL, ‘ the large Socialist gains were not due to
109 NLS, GUA, ‘minute book’, General Committee, 9 Jan., 27 Mar. 1933, ACC. 10424/74.
110 NLS, Shedden ‘municipal ﬁle ’, ACC. 10424/9 (xii), ‘minute book’, General Committee, 24 Feb.
1936, ACC. 10424/74. 111 Glasgow Herald, 14 Sept. 1936.
112 NLS, GUA, ‘minute book’, Local Elections Sub-committee, 22 Dec. 1936, ACC. 10424/74.
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their own strength, but to the split in the Anti-Socialist vote through the inter-
vention of the Scottish Protestant League’.113 The failure of the administration
to deliver its promised economies and the increase in rates was recognized as
having encouraged moderate supporters either to abstain or switch to the SPL
as a protest. Other, more long-term or structural factors operating against the
moderates were touched upon, and these were given greater attention the fol-
lowing year, after the electoral arrangement with the SPL had failed to turn the
tide. Five ‘main causes of defeat ’ were identiﬁed. These were the Catholic vote ;
corporation employees ; council house tenants ; people in receipt of public assist-
ance ; and ‘ the inﬂuence of the Co-operative Societies ’.114
Recognizing the issues, however, did not mean that the unionists had any clear
idea what to do about them. The Catholic electorate was regarded as uniformly
hostile, but there was no strategy to appeal to it. The increasing numbers of Co-
operative societies aﬃliated to the Co-operative party and therefore labour, had
been giving the unionists cause for concern for some time. Periodic appeals were
made to try to organize unionists who were co-operators to counter this politi-
cization, but there is no evidence of any deﬁnite action being undertaken.115
Labour’s increase of the ‘dole ’ was seen as having made a major impact ‘ in very
many Wards ’, but there was no mention of any response to this. If the moderates
and unionists hoped the issue would just go away, they were to be disappointed :
as late as January 1939 Glasgow’s adult male unemployment rate stood at over
20 per cent.116
The corporation housing schemes were described as ‘hotbeds of socialism’,
and it was assumed that the ‘vast army’ of public employees would be more
sympathetic to labour. The terminology used indicates the essentially negative
response, which ignored the fact that both phenomena had developed not under
labour but under a moderate administration. In turn this illustrates the inherent
weakness of the moderates. The unity of their purpose in opposing labour was
where their strength lay, but this hid the lack of any distinctive political or ad-
ministrative strategy. The core middle-class supporters wanted nothing more
than economies and lower rates bills, but this was ultimately incompatible with
the need to respond to working-class supporters as well as meet the statutory
obligations placed upon the corporation. The sudden emergence of the SPL in
the worst depths of the depression gave the anti-socialist voter an alternative to
the moderates for the ﬁrst time. However, given the economic conditions of
the 1930s in Glasgow, it is diﬃcult to see how the moderate balancing act could
have continued. The fact is that with the collapse of the SPL, the middle-class
wards were regained whereas the crucial working-class wards were lost for good.
113 NLS, Shedden ‘municipal ﬁle ’, ACC. 10424/9 (xii).
114 NLS, GUA, ‘minute book’, General Committee, 26 Nov. 1934, ACC. 10424/74, Shedden
‘municipal ﬁle’, ACC. 10424/9 (xii).
115 Ibid., 25 May 1925, 29 Mar. 1926, 7 Jan. 1935, 30 Mar., 27 Apr. 1936.
116 The Glasgow ﬁgure was slightly above the Scottish total of 20 per cent adult men unemployed.
See Ministry of Labour, Local unemployment index.
R E S I S T I N G L A B OU R 399
The political fault lines in Glasgow in the inter-war period provide little
evidence of the likelihood of any progressive alliance. The main issue for the
middle class was how best to resist the advance of labour. At the parliamentary
level this meant support for the Unionist party, as the liberals were revealed as
a marginal force whose eﬀorts at elections became increasingly sporadic and in-
consequential. At the municipal level, co-operation between liberal and unionist
developed out of a pre-existing tradition of ‘no politics ’ that came to be seen as
crucial in order to thwart labour’s ambitions and secure moderate control of the
corporation. The unity engendered between the two parties was rarely threa-
tened. In 1929 when hostility to the liberals at national elections was intense, the
Glasgow unionists refused to sacriﬁce local unity. Faced with choosing between
a liberal moderate and a unionist moderate, the GUA’s decision was to make
no recommendation rather than support their own man.117 It was only in 1938
that party politics intervened when ﬁve liberals stood against moderates : totalling
well under 2,000 votes, they ‘made a miserable show’.118
The solidarity engendered by anti-socialism was strengthened further by anti-
Catholicism. This was hardly new to the west of Scotland but, in the early 1920s,
it became a more substantial and virulent phenomenon. This has been explained
in relation to the ending of the short post-war boom and, with it, the collapse of
conﬁdence about Scotland’s future.119 The Protestant churches, which led the
campaign against the Irish, were as equally concerned at the perceived threat
posed by socialism and, indeed, linked both together. Political realignment in the
churches in the early 1920s saw conservative leaders reassert their authority and
reject the calls for reconstruction that had been embraced by the General As-
semblies during the war and immediately after. In this shift they enjoyed the
support of their middle-class congregations.120
The Presbyterian churches were also involved in the setting up of the Moderate
party and certainly the unionists shared their anti-Catholic prejudices. However,
there were limits as to how far the moderates and unionists would use sectarianism
as part of their political appeal. The closest they came to this was in 1934 when
they reached an agreement with the SPL at the municipal election. Yet, as we
have seen, this backﬁred badly and there were moderates prepared to take on the
SPL directly. In its internal post-mortem on the 1933 defeat, the GUA aﬃrmed
that it ‘ is not a sectarian any more than it is a class party ’. Moreover, it actually
defended the very provisions of the 1918 Education Act which fuelled the ‘Rome
on the Rates ’ propaganda of the SPL.121
117 NLS, GUA, ‘minute book’, General Committee, 28 Oct. 1929, ACC. 10424/74. This dilemma
occurred in the Cathcart ward.
118 Ibid., 28 Nov. 1938. 119 Gallagher, Uneasy peace, p. 135.
120 Brown, ‘Outside the Covenant’, pp. 22–5.
121 NLS, Shedden ‘municipal ﬁle’, ACC. 10424/9 (xii). The argument was threefold: that the Act
remedied the injustice whereby Catholics paid education rates but got no beneﬁts in return; that the
religious instruction provided in non-denominational schools was ‘Protestantism pure and simple’ ;
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education altogether.
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The history of the Moderate party in Glasgow provides us with evidence of
middle-class hostility to reconstruction and social reform. Whatever residual an-
tagonisms Glasgow’s liberals and unionists felt for one another, they were not
suﬃcient to deﬂect both groups from concentrating upon the most important
task in hand – keeping labour out of oﬃce. In achieving this aim, the moderates
were aided by a more restrictive municipal franchise which limited the numbers
of young working-class men on the voters’ roll. However, to secure their majority
the moderates had to win seats in wards that were predominantly working class
and thus had to have an appeal to the working-class electorate. In part this was
achieved speciﬁcally by moderate councillors in those wards being more respon-
sive to working-class issues and needs. In part it was achieved by a general, shared
ideology of anti-socialism and anti-Catholicism.
With the depression the moderates could no longer satisfy both their middle-
class and working-class supporters, and a militant, politicized Protestantism pro-
vided a vehicle of protest against the perceived failures of the administration.
Labour beneﬁted in the short term from the split in its opponent’s forces, which
were more serious than its own divisions, and, in the longer term, from the
transference of working-class votes. Having dabbled with the SPL, the moderates
and unionists retreated from out and out sectarianism and reiterated their mess-
age of economy and anti-socialism. Relaunched as the Progressive party, the am-
bitious plans for organization and campaigns failed to come to fruition. Having
identiﬁed the structural causes of their defeat, their response was essentially
negative, and even anti-democratic. Secure as before in their suburban strong-
holds, none the less the glue that had bound together the class alliance was now
dissolved. With it also dissolved the moderate majority.
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